

### Biosafety in upstream bioprocessing

Erik Kakes, Sales & Marketing director Applikon Biotechnology



#### **About Erik Kakes**



- Studied Biochemistry
- Active in bioreactor design since 1988
  - Project manager
  - Product development
  - Marketing & Sales
- Co-owner of Applikon Biotechnology since 2008



# **Applikon Biotechnology**

- One of the largest privately owned bioreactor companies
- Started in 1974 by Jan van Burg
- Keywords:
  - Reliable
  - New technologies
  - Long term customer relation
  - Micro scale to production scale systems
  - Local experts for sales, service and support
  - Bioreactor systems only
- Daughter companies in Netherlands, UK, USA, China



Jan van Burg



#### Applikon history in vaccine production

- 1970's: Bilthoven units Dr. van Hemert & Ir. van Wezel
- 1989 Applikon and Contact Flow merger
- 1990's: China Vaccine Project RIVM, DHV, Applikon
- Last 30 years Multiple large scale vaccine projects





#### **Laboratory bioreactors**













#### **Production systems**





#### **Single Use systems**

























#### Vaccine Development





#### **Facility Development**







Commercial Manufacturing, QC & QA

## Biosafety vs GMP

- Biosafety
  - Protect the operator



- GMP
  - Protect the consumer



### Biosafety

- Responsibility of supplier & customer
- Customer:
  - Provide safe environment for personnel
  - Inform supplier of potential risks
- Supplier:
  - Intrinsic safety as a design criterium
  - Understand and minimize the process risks
- Communication is key







#### Project communication: Website

- Open information exchange
- 24/7 accessible
- Up-to-date information
- Documented communication
- Documented decisions
- Everybody works with the same documents
- No surprises





# Recap: Bioreactor



=Risk Area



## Biosafety: Single-Use or Re-Usable

- Single-Use
  - Short lead time
  - Lower initial investment
  - More flexibility
  - More manual labor so more procedures required

- Re-Usable
  - Longer lead time
  - Higher initial investment
  - Less flexibility
  - More automation



Biosafety: Single-Use bioreactors

- Report April 2016, Dutch Commission for Genetic Modification
  - Integrity test of bag not standardized
  - Biggest risk is during installation where manual manipulation is the highest risk
  - No reliable integrity test possible after installation
  - Increased risk for operator
  - Continuous training programs are needed





Updated GMO Containment Risk Evaluation Of Single-Use Bioreactors

CGM 2016-04 ONDERZOEKSRAPPOR




### Biosafety: Re-Usable bioreactors

- Benefits of process automation
  - Less manual manipulation
  - Automated test procedures
  - Automated documentation
  - Interlocks for increased safety
  - Verified automated transfer between units
  - Continuous feedback loops






# Recap: Bioreactor Biosafety



# Recap: Bioreactor GMP

=Risk Area





-Off-gas Incinerator

-Gas Filters




Exhaust gas filter


- 0.2 micrometer pore size
- Membrane filter
- Integrity test points
- Test integrity before and after process








### Exhaust gas incinerator






- Temperature measurement & Control
- Time & heat kill, continuous monitoring
- 200 °C, Up to 200 l/min



# Agitator sealing

- Magnetic coupling
- No direct contact between inside and outside of reactor
- Minimal maintenance
- Up to 40 Nm torque
- Cell culture up to 3000 liter volume
- Microbial up to 500 liter volume






### Equipment risk management

- Focus on the interfaces!!!
  - Different suppliers
    - Building, upstream and downstream equipment
  - Different equipment
    - Liquid flow path, connection types, temperatures, flows
  - Different software solutions
    - Handshakes between devices, communication and data integration, validation, unified operator interfaces
- Use as many standard building blocks as possible
  - Proven performance








### Hazop study


- What is Hazop?
  - Hazard and operability study
  - a structured and systematic examination of a complex planned or existing process or operation in order to identify and evaluate problems that may represent risks to personnel or equipment













## Hazop study report

#### maition

-1 to 3.1 barg

0-150°C

OP: 0.2-0.7 bargSIP: 1.1-1.3 bargCIP: 0-0.2 barg

OP: 25-37°CSIP: 121-125°CCIP:70-90°C

WV: 706LTV: 1000L

product contact: SS 316L (1.4404); Silicone/ EPDM/ PVDF

CS: 1.5 bargCIP: 4-6 barg 0.4-5 m3/h water with 2% detergent (alkali/acid)Medium out 2: 12L/min 0.5 bargNutrient / feed: 2.3-12L/min 0.5 bargAlkali (20rpm pump)Inoculum: 4L/min (0.5 barg?)Feed: 30L/minMedium out 1: 30L/min 0.5 bargBiowaste: atm back

Lent Production of IPV vaccine.relief cases: air overpressure; steamvalve failure; continued fermentation; liquid overfill (CIP)


- 7	F-55 - 20-20-0			Г		Risk			ov			Т	N. 1000 A. 1000 A. 1000		100 kg				Г
	Deviation	Caus	se	Co	nsequence	category	before	risk re	ductio	n		Eff	ective Safe guards	after r	isk red	uction			Re
_							C (sev.)	(exp.)	P (avoi	W (prob	. RR			C (sev.)	F (exp.)	P (avoi	W (prob.	RR	
	1 Pressure high	- 1	Blocked offgas: V-11.X2/V-11.X6 or V-9.11 fail closed Blocked filter: F-11.X1	L	Elevated P due to gas supply without venting, leading to pressurize up to 2barg (P setting of R-3,52)	Safety	C1	F2	P1	W2	-		PSE-13.02 @ 2.43barg PSH-9.11 @ 1.5barg PAH-9.11						
	1	1		2	Continued cultivation at high P: extra CO2 production; possibility to pressurize beyond design P=3.1barg Possible operator exposure due to rupture of silicone tubing of additions.	Safety	C2	F2	P1	W2	SIL1		PSE-13.02 @ 2.43barg PAH-9.11 BS12 (max), no permanent injury expected	C1	F2	P1	W2		
	1	2	PT-9.11 fails low closing V-9.11	1	Increase of P beyond 3.1barg by continued cultivation Possible operator exposure due to rupture of silicone tubing of additions. Increased pressure to max 1barg. No P		C2	F2	P1	W2	SIL1		PSE-13.02 @ 2.43barg BSI.2 (max), no permanent injury expected	C1	F2	P1	W2		



### Hazop rating

#### For risk reduction, both standards IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 basically define the following steps:

- Risk definition and assessment according to detailed probabilities of failure from sensor over controller to actuator for the overall component life time.
- Specification and implementation of measures for risk reduction.
- Use of suitable instrumentation (evaluated or certified).
- Periodic test for correct operation of the safety functions.



#### Consequences

- C1 minor injury
- C2 serious permanent injury to one or more persons; death of one person.
- C3 death of several persons
- C4 very many people killed

#### Exposure time

- F1 rare to more often
- F2 frequent to permanent

#### Avoidance of hazard

- P1 possible under certain circumstances
- P2 almost impossible

#### Probability of unwanted occurance


- W1 very slight
- W2 slight
- W3 relatively high



## Hazop actionlist

	prior to use the equipment.	1		
1.11.1.1.	Do not use chlorides in the vessel if T>50°C. In case chlorides are required, do not perform full sterilization with chlorides pressent, sterilize this feed in a separate vessel. Describe appropriate use in SOP.	Customer		
1.12.1.1.	Unable to rank risk due to lack of knowledge on microcarrier filling procedure. Effect of breathing this dust is unknown to Applikon. Scope of equipment for Applikon ends at filling port. Recommended to be adressed by user prior to use the equipment.	Customer		
1.35.1.1.1	SOP must be defined for operation of sterilization routine.	Customer		
1.39.1.1.1	Confirm CIP pump specs and maximum CIP supply P	Customer		
1.39.1.1.1	Consider opening other route to drain during clean offgas to bioreactor flowpath (i.e. V-14.43&44)	Applikon		
	1.35.1.1.1 1.39.1.1.1	1.11.1.1.  Do not use chlorides in the vessel if T>50°C. In case chlorides are required, do not perform full sterilization with chlorides pressent, sterilize this feed in a separate vessel. Describe appropriate use in SOP.  1.12.1.1.  Unable to rank risk due to lack of knowledge on microcarrier filling procedure. Effect of breathing this dust is unknown to Applikon. Scope of equipment for Applikon ends at filling port. Recommended to be adressed by user prior to use the equipment.  1.35.1.1.1  SOP must be defined for operation of sterilization routine.  1.39.1.1.1  Confirm CIP pump specs and maximum CIP supply P  1.39.1.1.1  Consider opening other route to drain during clean offgas to bioreactor flowpath (i.e. V-		









## Resuming

- Biosafety is a shared responsibility
- Advanced automation improves safety
- Build intrinsic safety into design
- Hazop analysis identifies problems and solutions
- Hazop can be done on old and new installations



# Thank you!

