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Cert to Revenue Area Decision
Some Key Definitions
Hazard
 potential source of HARM (ISO/IEC Guide 51:1999, definition 3.5)
Hazardous situation
 circumstance in which people, property, or the environment are exposed to one or more hazard(s)
Harm
 physical injury or damage to health of people, or damage to property or the environment (ISO/IEC Guide 51:1999, definition 3.1)
Severity
measure of the possible consequences of a
© CBE – DCVMN ସିନ୍ଦ୍ରିଙ୍କି ପିତ୍ର କରି କରି କରି କରି କରି କରି କରି କରି କରି କର











Apply	ing QRM to the PQS Quality System
QS Element	Rationale for Application
Auditing Programs	Assign non-conformance criticality ratings based on risk to GMP compliance or product safety.
Complaints and Recalls	Assign initial risk evaluations to incoming incidents and again after post investigation.
CAPA System	Generally incidents or potential risks are qualified into the CAPA system from other QMS elements. The CAPA system manages the company higher level risk issues.Rational for Application
Deviations	Initial informal potential risks are assessed whenever a deviation occurs. If the risk is assessed as potentially significant then a formal deviations report is raised and risk is assessed within that document.
Quality Defects (Non- conformances)	Whenever a product or material does not meet specifications or in- house control limits a non-conformance report is raised. The final disposition of the Lot is not based on risk assessment however the potential for other related Lots to also be defective may be warranted based on a risk assessment.

Applying QRM to the PQS Quality					
QS Element	Rationale for Application				
Computerised Systems	Computerised systems are assessed for risk levels based on GxP criticality and system complexity. This will drive the validation programs and the extent of formal controls.				
Validation Programs	The cGMP requires that validation programs be driven by risk assessment (Annex $15 - 1$ Principle. This is addressed in the VMP.				
Change Control	Change control requires an impact assessment based on potential risks to marketing authorisation, compliance, maintenance of the validated state and patient safety.				
Training and Documentation	The depth and extent of training and documentation should be directly related to the criticality of that operation to product quality. For example intensive competency training and documentation is required for aseptic operators but may not be warranted for non GMP related activities.				





CBE **Formal and Informal Risk Techniques** (ICH Q9) It is neither always appropriate nor always necessary to use a formal risk management process (using recognized tools and/or internal procedures, e.g., standard operating procedures). The use of informal risk management processes (using empirical tools and/or internal procedures) can also be considered acceptable The level of effort, formality, and documentation of the quality risk management process should be commensurate with the level of risk. © CBE - DCVMN 013 V3 16

17

CBE When should Risk Assessment be initiated? Event Occurs If Then the event is judged to be insignificant do not initiate a formal risk assessment. Record or has negligible potential to impact a the event as required by SOPs and GMP patient records. The reason for the decision to not to conduct a formal risk assessment is not needed. the event may or may not be consider moving to a formal risk assessment. significant or may have some Seek the advice of the QA Manager and other potential to impact a patient company management before proceeding. The reason for any decision to not to conduct a formal risk assessment is required.

the event has reasonable foreseeable initiate a formal risk assessment. potential to be significant or impact a patient

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R	elating Hazards to	Harm – Ex	
Potential Hazard	Foreseeable sequence of events (Failure Mode)	Hazardous situation	Harm (Severity)
Chemical (cleaning residue)	 Incomplete cleaning of equipment used in prod' n Use wrong cleaning agent 	Patient receives undetected dose of impurities	Adverse reactionAcute injuryComplaint
Biological (Microbial contamination)	 (1) Excessive bioburden in bulk mix due to: (1) poor cleaning (2) extended/ wet storage of equipment (3) Environmental 	Bioburden grows through the filter and contaminates product. Lower SAL	 Fails sterility test Bacterial infection Death
Pyrogens (biological contamination)	 Excessive pyrogens in product due to: HAO cycle failure Inadequate vial wash 	Undetected pyrogens appear in finished product.	 Fails LAL test Febrile reaction by patient Acute / chronic injury
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Suggested Severity Levels					
Severity level (Quantitative)	Severity level (Qualitative)	Example description of consequences			
1	Negligible	Will not result in harm requiring attention.			
2	Marginal	Results in customer inconvenience and/or harm requiring local first aid treatment.			
3	Moderate	Results in serious harm or a customer / community health problem requiring medical treatment.			
4	Critical	Results in extensive harm or a customer / community health problem requiring hospitalisation or prolonged medical treatment.			
5	Catastrophic	Results in death or extensive harm; a general community health problem attracting public interest and requiring significant medical treatment or hospitalisation for those effected.			
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Suggested Likelihood Levels						
Likelihod level (Quantitative)	Likelihood level (Qualitative)	Example description of probability (based on events/time)				
1	Rare	May occur every 10–30 years				
2	Unlikely	May occur every 5-10 years				
3	Possible	May occur every 1-5 years				
4	Likely	May occur more than once per year				
5	Almost Certain	May occur several times per year				
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	Example Risk Evaluation Table						
		• Severity					
		Negligible (1)	Marginal (2)	Moderate (3)	Critical (4)	Catastrophic (5)	
	Almost certain (5)	Medium (5)	High (10)	High (15)	High (20)	High (25)	
Ą	Likely (4)	Low (4)	Medium (8)	High (12)	Hiqh (16)	High (20)	
obabili	Possible (3)	Low (3)	Medium (6)	Medium (9)	Hiqh (12)	High (15)	
Pr	Unlikely (2)	Low (2)	Low (4)	Medium (6)	Medium (8)	High (10)	
	Rare (1)	Low (1)	Low (2)	Low (3)	Low (4)	Medium (5)	
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The c	company ma	anufactures microdos	e, narrow therapeutic	;
preso Hz #	Hazard Statement	ts. The mixing proc Potential or Foreseeable Failure Modes:	Potential Harm:	Score
1	The patient receives a dose that is outside the therapeutic window	The mixing process is not validated for the new blender. The bulk product is not mixed to acceptable homogeneity (less than 3% rsd)	 (a) the patient receives excess dose - leads to patient acute discomfort and a complaint (b) the patient receives insufficient dose – which could lead to inadequate treatment and complaint / adverse event but no chronic harm. 	8

HZ#	Probability of Occurrence	Sco
1	 These records were examined In- process testing records for last 12 months (23 batches) Non-conforming (failed) batches history - last 2 years Complaints history Maintenance history of the blending equipment Adverse events profile Internal audit reports for the process line Tested multiple samples from the current manufactured Lot The risk team concluded that the process potentially that it was possible that 1 in 10 batches would produce defects.	8

Hz#	Detectability	Score	Frequency Score
1	The risk team identified, via examination of batch records and process instructions:	8	The Frequency was calculated as: [Pr(occur) (8) X Detect. (8)] ^{0.5}
	There was no in-process testing for bulk blend uniformity.		= 8
	The QC laboratory tested 20 tablets for content uniformity from an average batch size of 200,000 tablets		
	Occasional units are checked for defects		







	Types of tools						
	Facilitation (Qualitative) Tools	Analytical (Semi) Quantitative Tools					
	Brainstorming	Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA);					
	Cause and Effect Diagrams	Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP);					
	Flowcharts	Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA);					
	Risk ranking and filtering	Supporting statistical tools					
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Summary of Main (Semi) Quantitative Risk Tools							
Feature	PHA	FTA	HACCP	FME(C)A			
Purpose	Preliminary risk identification	Identify probable fault paths	Identify process risks and controls	Assess product / process failure modes and quantitative risk			
Focus	Simple version of FMEA	Root cause(s) of process faults	Process hazards eg contaminants	Identify and risk rate failure modes			
Strengths	Easy application with limited data	Shows multiple factors effect on one fault	Identify CPPs for a unit process	Rank and prioritize risks			
Limitations	Limited value for complex systems	No risk ranking or prioritisation	Must understand the process – relies on SME	Analysis complex and tedious			
Severity ?	Yes	No	Yes	Yes			
Likelihood ?	Yes	Optional	Yes, SME needed	Yes			
Detectability ?	No	Optional	Yes	Yes			
Output	Tables	Charts/ graphics	Tables	Tables			
Rank / Metric	Rank - Semi Q	No rank/ Qual.	Partial/ Qual.	Rank - Quant.			
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Quality Record – Simplified FMEA Record											QR xxx - 01	
	Participants in RA										-	
KA Prepared by:					RA Approved by:				lumber	: yy/##		
		1.000										
Product/Process Name Inte:								formar		Lot #		
onaba		<u> </u>		Design L Add	lecompi			Sourc	e Ref. #	¢		
			Prese	ent Risk					Re	maining	or Residual Risk	
Ref	Hazard/Patient Harm ((Consequences) Potential Failure Mode		5) Likelihood of Failure Mode Occurring Pr. (0) and Detection (Frequency)**		Freq. RPN (F) S x F	Recommended Action / Mitigation Or Current Controls	(S)	Ereq. (F)	RPN S x F	Comments	Evaluation, Report	
** Fre	quency: combination	of the Likel	lihood of the faile	ure mode occurri	ing X the	 Detecta 	ability = [Pr(O) × Detect] ^e	• Whe	re there	is no dete	actability, just use Lik	elihood.

